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In this paper, we present a rigorous modular statistical approach
for arguing safety or its insufficiency of an autonomous vehicle
through a concrete illustrative example. The methodology relies
on making appropriate quantitative studies of the performance of
constituent components. We explain the importance of sufficient
and necessary conditions at component level for the overall safety
of the vehicle. A simple concrete example studied illustrates how
perception system analysis at component level can be used to prove
or disprove safety at the vehicle level.
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mentation, residual risk quantification, modular safety argumentation, statist-
ical safety analysis, operational design domain, autonomous driving, automated
braking.
1 Introduction
Road vehicles can cause immense harm if driven inadequately and autonom-
ous vehicles are no exception. Autonomous driving (AD) safety is about the
absence of harm stemming from the automated driving function responsible
for translating sensor measurements into control actions influencing the vehicle
dynamics. As is customary in engineering domains concerned with developing
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systems that have the potential to cause public harm, the safety of autonom-
ous driving systems is also being addressed by international standards and
regulations, compliance with which assures the public about the absence of
unreasonable risk.
There are multiple standards existent and in development addressing AD
safety among which the most prominent being ISO21448 ’Safety of the Intended
Functionality (SOTIF)’ [5] and the ISO26262 standard series for Functional
Safety (FS) [6] and their updates. The development of the SOTIF standard
follows in the footsteps of by now well-established and ubiquitous ISO26262
functional safety standard and is intended to address the safety aspects of
autonomous driving functions that are not addressed by ISO26262. It is a
simplistic but still useful analogy to think about SOTIF as governing the safety
of the driver (autonomous driving system) and the ISO2626 series governing
the safety of the more traditional aspects of electrical and electronic automotive
systems that are not much dependent on perceiving and interacting with the
complex surrounding environment. What is common in the application of both
standards is that careful quantitative assessment of risks must be provided in
order to justify that the expected harm during system operation will be below
pre-specified acceptable threshold levels.
A common way to quantify safety is in terms of risk, which mathematically
is expressed as an expectation E[H] with H representing a measure of actual
harm (e.g. number of deaths/injuries/etc.) calculated over a unit distance or
time of driving. A quantitative safety target is expressed as a required upper
bound for the risk, i.e. E [H] < , where  is a small number representing
an acceptable level of risk. Thus the validity of the inequality is considered
as the acceptance criterion for the autonomous vehicle safety (see [5], particu-
larly, Annex C). We note that the risk quantity E[H] is not just a theoretical
construct but will manifest itself in reality through collisions, insurance claims,
lawsuits, and callbacks during the vehicle operation, demanding painstaking
quantitative safety assessment. The schematic diagram depicting the basic
iterative development processes at the core of ISO 21448 appears in Figure 1.
Arguing whether an autonomous vehicle meets quantitative safety targets
is a complex matter and still a largely open research question of tremendous
societal impact. There are two main existing approaches available as poten-
tial solutions/methodologies. The first is to estimate the risk via real-world
autonomous vehicle testing. Unfortunately, a direct approach is practically
infeasible in most situations as the distances required to be driven to obtain
results with a desired level statistical accuracy (confidence) are enormous [7].
Not to mention that the public is directly exposed to an unknown level of risk
exposing a moral issue. Another unfavourable practical aspect of direct val-
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idation is the resulting rigidity of the system design as modification of most
modules of the AD system in principle requires performing the same excruci-
atingly lengthy and costly validation again from scratch. The second approach
is to build an accurate representative model of the autonomous system, the
environment, and their interactions, and then use the multitude of simulated
scenarios generated by the model to estimate the risks of interest. Simulation
for AD testing is a very active research area both in industry and academia
with the papers [11, 10, 8, 1, 3, 10], a non-exhaustive list providing an over-
view of the area. With the potential benefits of simulation aside, whether it is
possible to build a sufficiently accurate model of all the relevant complex real-
world phenomena and justify its real-world equivalency necessary to obtain
an accurate real-world risk estimate is unclear [12]. Though the acceptance
criterion is formulated at the vehicle level, another highly desired feature of
safety argumentation is support for modular designs so that component-level
and Operational Design Domain (ODD) analyses can be combined into a final
safety argument at the vehicle-level. The potential benefits of modular safety
argumentation are reduced validation costs as separate component-level and
ODD analyses can be cheaper and reusable, comparing to vehicle-level random
road testing. To this end, in this article we present an example application of a
methodology for producing rigorous quantitative arguments for arguing safety
or its insufficiency for autonomous driving functions (steps 1 and 2 in Figure
1) with the following three desirable features; arguments that are:
• modular, utilising component-level analysis, and
• statistically rigorous, with the uncertainty about meeting the acceptance
criterion quantified,
• cost-efficient, through reusable analyses of constituent modules.
The fundamental guiding principle in our approach is to avoid making any
strong modelling assumptions that are not known for certain or that cannot be
justified well statistically from data. Instead we rely on probabilistic worst-case
thinking and choose to be conservative about any assumptions that cannot be
justified. This typically boils down to deliberately making overly pessimistic
or overly optimistic assumptions comparing to reality, depending on the type
of argument (for safety or for lack of it) we want to make. In a sense, the
approach attempts to be ‘robust’ or ‘model-free’ as it is consistent with many
possible true real-world models.
In this paper, we conduct an analysis of a simple problem with the aim to
illustrate the key ideas and concepts encountered when applying this approach.
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Figure 1: The basic iterative development process diagram at the core of the
ISO21448 standard. This article presents how rigorous quantitat-
ive arguments for the process steps 1 and 2 can be obtained in an
illustrative example studied.
No claim is made regarding realism of the example or that the maxim of pess-
imism or optimism is upheld in every detail as such work is outside the scope
of this paper. Rather, the analysis presented should be taken as educational to
elucidate the main guiding principles in the process or as a potential starting
point for developing more detailed analyses of real autonomous driving systems.
The structure of this document is as follows. A description of a simple
autonomous driving system, its Operational Design Domain (ODD) and a form-
alised problem description can be found in the next section. Afterwards, we
proceed to describe the mathematical and statistical methodology for analys-
ing the safety aspects of the perception component as well as the autonomous
driving system as a whole (steps 1 and 2 in Figure 1). Finally, we give some
concluding remarks.
2 Problem description
Suppose we are an organisation wishing to deploy a new automated driving
system responsible for driving at a fixed constant velocity on a straight road
and for stopping in front of stationary objects that can occasionally appear on
this road. In order to obtain system certification for use within a certain type
of environment and mission profile, known as the Operational Design Domain
(ODD), we must produce an analysis of its behaviour and based on it provide
an argument whether the system is safe or unsafe to deploy in terms of meeting
or not meeting a quantitative safety target.
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The rest of this section proceeds to formalise this scenario. First, the odd is
specified and a simple model is defined. Next we specify an abstracted target
for the performance (behaviour) of the system in terms of the model set out
in the subsection before. Finally a specification of the braking system, to the
extent that its functions can be understood, is given.
2.1 Operational Design Domain specification and model
An autonomous driving function is to be validated for use. The design goal of
the system is to avoid collision events with other ego-actors or structures while
driving within the defined odd described below. Alternatively, this system can
be viewed as a debris detection function with an automated braking function-
ality as part of a more complex autonomous driving system. It is attached to a
vehicle which, apart from accelerating and braking, is driven in such a way as
to maintain a constant velocity v along a straight, homogeneous, single-lane,
one-way road. The surface friction µ of the road is constant and specified as
part of the odd for which the system is to be certified. Along the road path,
stationary objects obstructing the lane randomly appear ahead of the vehicle
during operation; the properties and frequencies of these obstructing objects
are given only informally in terms of, for example, a geographic region and/or
time of day. For the purpose of this document we will restrict the analysis to
the main driving session and exclude an analysis of the vehicle starting and
stopping at a departure point and terminus.
In order to transform this problem statement from the engineering language
above into a mathematical language of suitable rigour to permit probabilistic
analysis, the problem space is defined as follows. Let us now describe a single
driving session of a K km distance within the odd. Let Xt ∈ [0,K] be the
position, along the road, relative to the starting point, of the front part of
the vehicle at time t ≥ 0. Also let V t be the velocity and acceleration of the
vehicle at time t ≥ 0. All three will be assumed to satisfy standard regularity
conditions and that ddtV t =
d2
dt2Xt for each realisation of the vehicle trajectory.
To capture the positions of obstacles let N t be the point processes (random
measure) [2] such that for any interval I ⊆ [0,K] the number of obstacles in
I at time t is N t(I). The total number of obstacles that will be encountered
is given by No = N0([0,K]). As time goes on the number reduces due to the
vehicle stopping within the specified distance r. Finally let
T = {x ∈ [0,K] : ∃t Xt = x ∧ V t > 0, N t({x}) ≥ 1}
be the set of collisions and Nc = |T | the number of collisions.
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For completeness, before entering the K km road segment on which collisions
are counted, the vehicle is assumed to have been travelling at speed v for
distance c without any objects. This is to ensure that the vehicle is not already
within a dangerous collision distance at the beginning of the segment under
analysis.
2.2 Quantitative objective
The goal of any safety analysis would be to establish that the number of prob-
able collisions over the distance travelled Nc/K is sufficiently small for reason-
able sizes of K. That is to say, we would wish to establish an inequality of the
type
E[Nc/K] ≤ ε, (2.1)
where E[Nc/K] is the expected number of collisions generated by the system in
question within the defined odd and ε > 0 is some pre-specified quantitative
safety target level given to us.
2.3 Autonomous driving system specification
The vehicle is equipped with an autonomous driving functionality whose spe-
cification is as follows. A perception system for detecting objects in front of the
vehicle performs combined object detection & depth estimation using the avail-
able sensors and a perception algorithm for interpreting the sensor data. The
perception function runs at frequency f and provides a new distance estimate
to the closest object every 1/f seconds. The only thing we known about the
perception system is that it operates on a frame-by-frame basis using only the
newest sensor data that was not used previously for earlier distance-to-object
estimates.
If the distance estimate to the closest object falls below the braking threshold
c, the car starts braking at the level of maximum surface utilisation and sustains
this level of deceleration until it comes to a full stop. Moreover, in order avoid
some mathematical complications, we assume that after each braking event the
vehicle is safely restarted (reaccelerated) in such a way that the next stationary
object is approached at speed v with headway of at least c and in way that the
vehicle never gets stuck in a single location due to a false positive.
The braking functionality works as follows. The total braking distance to
full stop is denoted by b, where b < c, with c− b defined as the ’buffer distance’
to a collision. Hence if the car starts braking at a distance no more than c and
no less than b from an obstacle, then there is no collision; the obstacle is then
considered to move from the roadway, and the vehicle may proceed onward. A
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Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the vehicle and the odd setup in the example.
schema of these distances can be found in Figure 2, where we use the notation
l := v/f for the distance travelled by the vehicle between sequential iterations of
the perception system. Also, the frequency of the perception system iterations
is such that m = brf/vc ≥ 1, which is the guaranteed number of distance
estimates the perception system generates while traversing the buffer distance.
Also, let Lt be the true distance to the closest object in front of the vehicle at
time t and Dt the estimate of this distance produced by the perception system.
The brakes thus engage at any time point t when the system determines that
Dt < c.
The autonomous driving system and odd can now be combined to define
a simple, potentially hazardous, driving scenario. As the vehicle state evolves
over time while driving along the defined road section it will sequentially en-
counter multiple stationary objects, each of which must be avoided through
proper activation of the automatic braking functionality. As the vehicle ap-
proaches an object, the intended functionality of the design is to detect the
object and activate the braking system and stop the vehicle prior to collision.
A hazardous condition will develop during the scenario if the system fails to
properly estimate the distance to the object, and thereby either fails to brake
or triggers braking after the minimum safe stopping distance of Lt = b is viol-
ated. Hazardous events caused by the autonomous driving system correspond
to situations where the values between Lt and Dt differ significantly enough
that the condition of Dt < c is never met over the course of the scenario prior
to reaching the condition Lt < b. Once such a situation is generated, a collision
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cannot be avoided by the system as defined.
3 Robust probabilistic arguments
Having set a quantitative safety target in a previous section, we now proceed
to showing how rigorous arguments can be constructed to conclusively answer
whether the autonomous vehicle meets (argument 1 in Figure 1) or does not
meet (argument 2 in Figure 1) the safety target.
3.1 Sufficient conditions at the component-level for meeting a
vehicle-level safety target
When working with modular designs, focusing on sufficient conditions at the
component level in relation to the vehicle-level validation target can be benefi-
cial. A sufficient condition for a component is defined so that if it is met, then
the validation target is also met (given the knowledge of the functioning of the
rest of the system), e.g., E[H] < . Sufficient conditions can be obtained by
making assumptions that the world and the rest of the system behaves worse
(no better) than it actually does. Useful sufficient conditions are obtained from
a detailed understanding of the odd including its probabilistic aspects, such
as vehicle dynamics, physics of sensing technologies, and the system architec-
ture with its individual components and their dependencies. To justify that
sufficient conditions are met at a component level, statistical justifications can
be made by utilising practically manageable amounts of data, as the existing
knowledge about the problem is taken into account. Focusing on sufficient
conditions at a component level can yield not only validation cost reductions
but also allow the reuse of much of the safety analysis in case of a change in
the ODD or in a system component. Another advantage of such an approach
is that arguments for meeting more elaborate quantitative targets, e.g. incor-
porating fairness considerations [9], can be more practically achievable through
meeting their sufficient condition targets at a component level. Analogously,
when disproving the safety of the system, it is enough to show that necessary
safety conditions at component level are not met, which is a focus of section
3.3.
3.2 Statistical modular safety argument using sufficient conditions
Consider a single approach of a randomly picked obstacle from the route. In
particular, we only consider when the obstacle gets closer than c to the vehicle.
Any braking happening earlier than this will simply result approaching the
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obstacle anew according to the system specification. Let V h denote the speed
at which the obstacle is hit with V h = 0 if the vehicle stops appropriately and
does not hit the obstacle. The situation thus far is summarised in Figure 2.
Thus in this specific example, we have the decomposition
E[Nc] = P(V h > 0)E[No]. (3.1)
In addition, let us denote l0 = c, l1 = b +mv/f, . . . , lm−1 = b + v/f, lm =
b. From the system specification, a depth estimate update is received every
distance v/f travelled, so let us denote (Dj , Lj) := (Dtj , Ltj ) where tj is the
unique sampling time point such that Ltj ∈ [lj , lj−1). Thus L0, L1, . . . , Lm
and D0, D1, . . . , Dm correspond to the true distances and distance estimates
produced while the obstacle being approached passed through the buffer region.
Also, let write Zj := Dj − Lj for the corresponding estimation errors.
While the perception system operates independently on each received frame
of sensor data the sensor data itself is certainly not independent. We therefore
know little about the dependence structure between Z1, . . . , Zm. Nevertheless,
we can certainly say that
P(V h > 0) = P(no braking on [b, c))
= P(Dj > c for all j)
≤ min
j=1,...,m
P(Dj > c).
(3.2)
The inequality is an equality in case of the worst case dependence between es-
timation errors. This would be an ‘all or nothing’ scenario where allD1, . . . , Dm
are greater than c as soon as this is the case for the one with lowest marginal
probability of being greater than c.
Thus in this specific example, we get that the risk
E[Nc] ≤
(
min
j=1,...,m
P(Dj > c)
)
E[No].
Each of P(Dj > c) for j = 1, . . . ,m depends only on the performance of
sensors while E[No] is purely a property of the environment. Both can be
studied statistically and controlled by, for example, by estimating confidence
intervals. The above analysis then transfers results of such a statistical analysis
to a potential safety argument at the vehicle-level.
Example 1. (Modular safety argument via sufficient conditions) To illustrate
the argument above even more concretely, let us assume that the validation
target is less than 1 collision in 100000 km of driving on average and to be
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proven with a confidence level of at least 1 − α, i.e. E[Collisions per km] <
1/100000 with confidence at least 1−α. Suppose that one estimates that there
is less than 1 stationary road object per 100 km (e.g. from traffic or driving
statistics) with confidence at least 1−α1, i.e. E[Objects per km] < 1/100 with
confidence at least 1−α1. In addition, suppose that one also estimates that the
detection performance P (Dm > c) < 1/1000 with confidence at least 1 − α2.
Then, using the proposed upper bound (3.2) above, E [Collisions per km] <
1/100 × 1/1000 with confidence at least 1 − (α1 + α2) = 1 − α. Here the
confidence levels are combined as justified by elementary probability rules 1.
3.3 Disproving vehicle-level safety through not meeting necessary
component-level conditions
In some circumstances one will want to perform converse analysis to the previ-
ous section, that is to prove that the system is, conclusively, unsafe. This may,
for example, serve to show that the issue is actually with the system, and not
with the conservative worst-case analysis performed when attempting to make
the safety argumentation.
As in the previous section, and (3.1), we may reduce the problem to studying
the approach of a single randomly picked obstacle. For simplicity of presenta-
tion, assume that r = mv/f so that the perception system generates exactly
m distance updates when traversing the intended braking window of length r.
When it comes to dependency of the estimation errors Z1, Z2, . . . for safety,
the best possible case one can practically wish for is that Z1, Z2, . . . are inde-
pendent (as already argued the requirements on rigour can be lowered when
arguing against the safety of the system) 2. In case of independence of errors,
we would have
P(V h > 0) ≥
∏
1≤j≤m
P(Zj > c− Lj)
≥
(
min
1≤j≤m
P(Zj > c− Lj)
)m
.
For some perception systems, it might be justified from the system design
knowledge that overestimation errors are decreasing with distance, in particu-
1If for any two events A and B, we have P(A) ≥ 1−α1 and P(B) ≥ 1−α2 , then P(A∩B) =
P (Ω)−P(Ω\(A∩B)) = 1−P((Ω\A)∪(Ω\B)) ≥ 1−(P(Ω\A)+P(Ω\B)) ≥ 1−(α1+α2).
2If one thinks about the best theoretical dependence structure for safety, it is the situation
Z1, Z2, . . . where either none or exactly one of D1 < c, . . . , Dm < c holds. Intuitively,
only one correct detection during the approach is required and in such situation no correct
detections are wasted.
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lar, implying that P(Zm ≥ z) ≤ P(Zj ≥ z) for all z > 0 and j ≤ m. Then
P(V h > 0) ≥ P(Zm > c− Lm)m.
As in the previous section, all relevant quantities can now be estimated with
confidence intervals from the perception system performance data and data
about the environment. More precisely
E[Nc] = P(V h > 0)E[No]
≥ P(Zm > c− Lm)mE[No].
This lower bound can be utilised to show that the vehicle-level quantitative
safety target is not met (a similar argument as in Example 1 can be followed
just with inequalities and one-sided confidence intervals reversed).
3.4 Statistical estimation considerations
The fundamental quantities to control in the two previous sections are P(Dj >
c) = P(Zj > c − Lj) for j = 1, . . . ,m and E[No]. In particular, for the bound
in Section 3.1 requires controlling minj=1,...,m P(Dj > c).
Unless one is able to make a case that a monotonicity assumption such as
in Section 3.3 one will not know at which j the minimum is achieved. It
would therefore generally not be enough to control P(Dj > c) separately for
each j and take the minimum since each separate estimate adds another level
of uncertainty. A simple way of compensating for this is to observe that a
minimum is certainly bounded by an average, so that for any probability vector
p1, . . . , pm we have
min
j=1,...,m
P(Dj > c) ≤
m∑
j=1
pjP(Dj > c) = P(DJs > c), (3.3)
where Js is independent of D and P(Js = j) = pj . In particular, if p1 =
0, . . . , pm−1 = 0, pm = 1, then DJs = Dm. More generally if we randomly
sample frames from the perception system in use, we may choose Js according
to the sampling distribution. This works even if this distribution is unknown, as
long as Js remains independent ofD (in practical terms, this excludes strategies
where sampling is based on information gathered from the sensors, such as
observing the system when an obstacle is estimated to be within a certain
distance).
The quantity P(DJs > c) can be estimated from individual frames if we
sample (LJ , DJ) uniformly within each interval [lj , lj−1). The problem of es-
timating is P(DJs > c) is that of estimating the probability parameter of the
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Bernoulli distribution distribution. However, note that to provide a safety
argument as in Example 1, we need to use a conservative one-sided interval
estimator (c.f. [13]).
In order to control the term E(No) we assume we have observed a num-
ber of road segments with accurate counts of the number of obstacles. This
data need not be from the same source as the perception system performance
data. Indeed, the perception system data may be produced by designed labor-
atory experiments while the data on number of road segment obstacles may
be derived from publicly available data sources covering the geographical area
designated by the odd.
Some care should be taken unless the observed road segments are all of
equal length K km. Longer segments should result in higher variance in the
number of obstacles, simply because there is more road segment for the total
number to vary on. A reasonably robust methodology (while not obviously
formally conservative) would be to consider the number on each road segment
to follow a Poisson distribution with mean proportional to the length. A one-
sided confidence interval for the expected number for a K km road segment can
be then estimated using known statistical methods as the resulting model is a
generalised linear model (Poisson-regression) [4].
4 Conclusions
Probabilistic and statistical modelling approach presented in this article allows
to analyse and argue for the vehicle-level safety or lack of it rigorously and
quantitatively through analysis of sufficient and necessary conditions for the
constituent components, exploiting available probabilistic decompositions. Be-
sides the clear benefits of facilitating modular design, this approach enables to
prove that sufficient safety conditions are met at the component level using less
or even a different type of data comparing to the vehicle-level road testing. In
the simple example studied, sufficient and necessary conditions as well as stat-
istical estimation techniques discussed can be refined further, however, the aim
of the paper here was to elucidate the main principles and benefits of rigorous
statistical modular safety argumentation for autonomous driving rather diving
deep into mathematical and statistical technicalities.
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